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In a number of states that have considered the Uniform Trust Code (“UTC”),
Article 5, "Creditor‟s Claims; Spendthrift And Discretionary Trusts," has become a flash
point of controversy.1 The prefatory note to the UTC states that much of the UTC is a
codification of the common law of trusts, but that it also introduces a number of
innovative provisions. UTC critics, on the one hand, claim that more than a hundred
years of common law have been tossed aside, giving creditors greatly expanded abilities
to reach through once impenetrable barriers that previously protected trust beneficiaries,
while supporters, on the other hand, assert that the innovative approach of the Code
actually strengthens the rights of beneficiaries in a number of important areas. Much of
this rhetoric actually has little application to the Ohio Uniform Trust Code (“OUTC”), as
a concerted effort has been made to codify existing Ohio law in the area of creditor
remedies, stripping away or modifying those provisions of the UTC that are at odds with
our current law. This article will discuss remedies that creditors of trust beneficiaries
currently have in Ohio, remedies that creditors would have under the "pure" UTC, and
changes that Ohio's Joint Committee2 has made to the UTC in the second draft of the
proposed OUTC.

Background
As work on the OUTC has moved steadily along,3 a number of practitioners from
Ohio and elsewhere have expressed concerns about the expansion of creditor remedies
under the UTC. In order to address these concerns, on behalf of the Joint Committee the
authors conducted a comprehensive study of creditor remedies under current Ohio law
and suggested to the Joint Committee possible changes for it to consider that would help
make the OUTC a codification of Ohio's existing law on this important subject. At its
July, 2004 meeting, the Joint Committee made many substantive changes to the first draft
of OUTC Chapter 5805 to help achieve that goal.
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Discretionary and Support Trusts
The common law and Restatement of Trusts (Second) treat discretionary trusts
and support trusts differently.4 The rights of beneficiaries of pure discretionary trusts
arguably are sufficiently nebulous to fall short of being judicially recognized as
constituting property interests for creditors‟ rights purposes.5 A beneficiary's entitlement
to distributions under a support trust, on the other hand, is determinable enough to give
the beneficiary the right to compel distributions pursuant to the applicable standard. In
point of fact, however, almost all trusts are neither pure discretionary trusts nor pure
support trusts, but instead have aspects of both. It was the recognition of this reality that
caused the drafters of the UTC to follow the lead of Restatement of Trusts (Third) and
remove the distinction between discretionary and support trusts.6 Critics have made much
of the proposed elimination of the dichotomy between discretionary trusts and support
trusts. The practical consequences of doing so, however, are quite limited for
discretionary trusts that also have a spendthrift provision,7 because most creditors of a
beneficiary may not reach the beneficiary‟s interest or trust assets (prior to their receipt
by the beneficiary in a distribution from the trustee) regardless of whether the trust
formerly would have been characterized as a discretionary trust or a support trust.8
Because most trusts have some type of distribution standard (e.g. health,
education, maintenance, support, comfort), pure discretionary trusts, which generally
have no standard, are not commonly used by practitioners and are rarely found in Ohio
case law. Nevertheless, when a pure discretionary trust is used, Ohio case law suggests
that no creditor, including a child support claimant, can reach the interest of the
beneficiary.9 UTC §501, however, removes this protection by providing broad remedies
to all creditors of beneficiaries of trusts, including pure discretionary trusts, if the
instrument does not include a spendthrift provision, or if the creditor has a claim that is
excepted from the protection the spendthrift provision provides. Because UTC §503
provides for exceptions to the effectiveness of spendthrift provisions, and because of the
possibility of a pure discretionary trust not including a spendthrift provision, the loss of
the protection that the common law afforded pure discretionary trusts is a serious
concern.10

Ohio's Proposed "Wholly Discretionary Trust" and the Judicial Standard of Review of
the Trustee’s Exercise of Discretion
The protection afforded beneficiaries of common law pure discretionary trusts
was deemed by the Joint Committee to be significant. In keeping with its goal of
codifying, but not changing, Ohio's trust law in the area of creditor remedies, the Joint
Committee has proposed the creation of a statutory safe harbor pure discretionary trust.
In the second draft of the OUTC, this trust is referred to as a "wholly discretionary trust"
("WDT"), which §5801.03(24) defines as:
(i) an irrevocable trust (ii) from which distributions of income or principal may be
made to or for the benefit of the beneficiary only at the trustee‟s discretion, (iii)
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from which the beneficiary does not have a power of withdrawal, (iv) the terms of
which use "sole," "absolute," "uncontrolled," or language of similar import to
describe the trustee's discretion to make distributions to or for the benefit of the
beneficiary, (v) the terms of which do not provide any standards to guide the
trustee in exercising its discretion to make distributions to or for the benefit of the
beneficiary, (vi) of which the beneficiary is not the settlor, the trustee, or a
cotrustee, and (vii) with respect to which the beneficiary does not have the power
to become the trustee or a cotrustee. A trust may be a wholly discretionary trust
with respect to one or more but less than all beneficiaries. If a beneficiary has a
power of withdrawal, the trust may not be a wholly discretionary trust with
respect to that beneficiary during the period the power may be exercised, but it
may be a wholly discretionary trust with respect to that beneficiary during periods
in which the beneficiary does not have a power of withdrawal. If the beneficiary
and one or more others have made contributions to the trust, the portion of the
trust attributable to the beneficiary‟s contributions may not be a wholly
discretionary trust with respect to that beneficiary, but the portion of the trust
attributable to the contributions of others may be. If a beneficiary has a power of
withdrawal, then upon the lapse, release, or waiver of the power, the holder is
treated as having made contributions to the trust only to the extent the value of the
property affected by the lapse, release, or waiver exceeds the greater of the
amount specified in Section 2041(b)(2) or 2514(e) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986, or Section 2503(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, in each case as
in effect on the effective date of this Code , or as later amended. Notwithstanding
(vi) and (vii), a trust may be a wholly discretionary trust if the beneficiary is, or
has the power to become, a trustee only with respect to the management or the
investment of the trust assets, and not with respect to making discretionary
distribution decisions.
UTC §814(a) provides that a trustee must exercise a discretionary power “in good
faith and in accordance with the terms and purposes of the trust and the interests of the
beneficiaries,” regardless of whether the trust instrument describes the trustee‟s discretion
as, for example, “absolute,” “sole,” or “uncontrolled.” Because the OUTC provides for
two kinds of discretionary trusts – WDTs and discretionary trusts that do not meet the
requirements of a WDT, such as one providing for the beneficiary‟s support –
§5808.14(A) provides separate standards of review for each:
The judicial standard of review for discretionary trusts other than wholly
discretionary trusts is that the trustee shall exercise a discretionary power
reasonably, in good faith, and in accordance with the terms and purposes of the
trust and the interests of the beneficiaries. The greater the grant of discretion by
the settlor to the trustee, the broader the range of permissible conduct by the
trustee in exercising it. The judicial standard of review for wholly discretionary
trusts is that a reasonableness standard shall not be applied, and a court will only
review the trustee's discretion if the trustee (i) acts with an improper motive; (ii)
acts dishonestly; (iii) fails to act; or (iv) acts in bad faith.
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An objective of the lower standard of review for WDTs is to protect, to the maximum
extent possible, the trustee from attempts by the beneficiary to compel distributions, and
to preclude a creditor of the beneficiary from arguing that it can reach the beneficiary‟s
interest, because the beneficiary could do so. The standard of review for WDTs does not
explicitly require the trustee to exercise good faith. Arguably, however, a good faith
standard is no different from one that prohibits the trustee conduct described in (i)
through (iv), above, and Ohio case law requires the trustee to act in good faith without
regard to the trustee‟s discretion being described as, for example, “absolute and
uncontrolled.”11 Even if that is the case, however, it does not make the second standard
applicable only to WDTs unnecessary, because the WDT standard provides that WDTs
are not subject to a reasonableness standard. Assuming that an action taken by a trustee
could be found to be unreasonable yet still made in good faith, the addition of a
reasonableness standard would be significant. At least some cases from other
jurisdictions have found the absence of a reasonableness standard critical in shielding
pure discretionary trusts from creditor attack.12
While the proposed statutory definition and judicial standard of review may be
sufficient to give WDTs the complete creditor protection they enjoyed under the common
law, the OUTC has added a new section, §5805.03, to make absolutely clear the lack of
creditor remedies:
No creditor or assignee of a beneficiary of a wholly discretionary trust may reach
the beneficiary‟s interest in the trust whether by attachment of present or future
distributions to or for the benefit of the beneficiary, by judicial sale, by obtaining
an order compelling the trustee to make distributions from the trust, or by any
other means, regardless of whether the trust instrument includes a spendthrift
provision.
While the scope of the WDT may be narrower than the common law concept of
the pure discretionary trust in that no distribution standard of any type may be used,13 the
common law pure discretionary trust in Ohio has no clearly defined parameters, so a
statutory safe harbor that sets forth with specificity the requirements should make up for
its arguably more limited scope.

Creditor Remedies Under UTC §501
The basis for most creditor remedies under the UTC is found in §501. That
section provides:
To the extent a beneficiary‟s interest is not protected by a spendthrift provision,
the court may authorize a creditor or assignee of the beneficiary to reach the
beneficiary‟s interest by attachment of present or future distributions to or for the
benefit of the beneficiary or other means. The court may limit the award to such
relief as is appropriate under the circumstances.
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The OUTC has moved UTC §501, in slightly modified form, to §5805.05, which
addresses the rights of creditors of beneficiaries of mandatory distribution trusts in the
absence of spendthrift protection. If UTC §501 were not limited to mandatory
distribution trusts in the OUTC, it would have left discretionary trusts that are not WDTs
(and not protected by a spendthrift provision) totally exposed to the remedies it lists. The
inclusion of UTC §501 in the OUTC with respect to discretionary trusts that are not
WDTs would have resulted in a significant expansion of creditor remedies in at least the
following two areas:
The Attachment Of Discretionary Distributions.14 Under current Ohio law,
generally a creditor may not attach a beneficiary‟s discretionary interest unless (i)
the trust was one under which the trustee was granted discretion to provide for
the beneficiary‟s support (referred to in Ohio as an “equivocal trust”),15 and (ii)
the creditor‟s claim was based on having provided support to the beneficiary.16 If
those two requirements are met, under Kreitzer17 the state of Ohio as creditor
may not only attach distributions the trustee decides to make, but may also
compel distributions to the creditor. Similarly, under Matthews v. Matthews,18 a
child support claimant of a beneficiary of a discretionary support trust may be
able to reach the trust assets. Furthermore, dictum in Martin v. Martin19 suggests
that other support creditors of a beneficiary of a discretionary support trust may
reach the trust assets. But in a situation not covered by Kreitzer, Matthews or,
possibly, Martin, the trustee may make discretionary distributions, and the
creditor would have to try to collect from the beneficiary. The result, therefore,
appears to be that in such situations, under current Ohio law, discretionary trusts
without spendthrift clauses receive comparable protection to spendthrift trusts.
The Attachment Of Distributions Made For the Benefit of the Beneficiary. By its
express terms, UTC §501 also permits the attachment of distributions made "on
behalf of" beneficiaries from trusts that are not protected by spendthrift
provisions. Under current Ohio law, if the trustee of a discretionary trust (in a
non-Kreitzer, non-Matthews, and, possibly, non-Martin situation) decided to
make the distribution to a third party for the beneficiary‟s benefit instead of
directly to the beneficiary, presumably the creditor would be unable to reach the
distribution. The limitation of UTC §501 in the OUTC to mandatory distribution
trusts should maintain current law regarding the inability of creditors to attach
distributions made from third party special needs trusts for the benefit of the
disabled beneficiary.
Some practitioners are concerned that the inclusion of the words "or other means"
in UTC §501's listing of creditor remedies (when spendthrift protection is not present)
will open the door to judicial sales of beneficiaries‟ interests. While the “or other means”
language of UTC §501 would allow the judicial sale of a beneficiary‟s interest, it would
seem very unlikely that a court would ever order the sale of a discretionary interest. In
that regard, it has been the experience of Ohio practitioners that this is a remedy that is
not used by creditors. To avoid the possibility of a judicial sale of a discretionary
interest, however, OUTC §5805.04(C) specifically denies this remedy for discretionary
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trusts that are not WDTs, even in the absence of spendthrift protection. (As discussed
above, beneficiaries‟ creditors may not reach their interests in WDTs by any means,
including judicial sales.)
For mandatory distribution trusts that are not protected by a spendthrift provision,
the “or other means” language of §5805.05(A) would allow a judicial sale of a
beneficiary‟s interest. That division, however, also provides two limitations on such a
remedy. First, with respect to any creditor‟s award against a beneficiary‟s interest in a
mandatory distribution trust, “[t]he court may limit an award under this section to such
relief as is appropriate under the circumstances, considering among other factors
determined appropriate by the court, if any, the support needs of the beneficiary, the
beneficiary‟s spouse, and the beneficiary‟s dependent children.” Second, “[i]f in
exercising its power under this section the court decides to order either a sale of a
beneficiary‟s interest or that a lien be placed on the interest, in deciding between the two,
the court shall consider (among other factors it deems relevant, if any) the amount of the
claim of the creditor or assignee and the proceeds a sale would produce relative to the
potential value of the interest to the beneficiary.”
UTC critics also have expressed concerns about the possible judicial sale of
beneficiaries‟ remainder interests. Absent spendthrift protection, the general rule is that a
beneficiary‟s interest in a trust, whether a current or future interest, is a property interest
that the beneficiary may alienate and that his or her creditors may reach.20 In Ohio, the
alienability of remainders has been codified in R. C. §2131.04, which states,
“[r]emainders, whether vested or contingent, executory interests, and other expectant
estates are descendible, devisable and alienable in the same manner as estates in
possession.” The alienability of remainders also has been recognized in Ohio case law. In
O’Connor v. O’Connor,21 for example, the settlor created a trust for his surviving spouse
for her lifetime, remainder to his son. After the settlor‟s death, and while the settlor‟s
surviving spouse was still living, the son and his wife divorced. Asserting claims for
alimony and child support, the son‟s wife attempted to reach the son‟s future interest in
the trust. The court, citing RC §2131.04, allowed her to attach the son‟s interest, even
though it was a remainder that would not become a current interest until his mother‟s
death.

Creditors' Ability to Compel Distributions
UTC §504 specifically bars most creditors from being able to compel
distributions from trusts that are subject to the trustee's discretion, even if the discretion is
expressed in the form of a standard of distribution or if the trustee has abused its
discretion.22 The classes of creditors not barred by this provision are limited to three: (i)
children for whom an order or judgment for child support has been entered, (ii) the
beneficiary's current spouse who has a judgment or court order for support or
maintenance, and (iii) any former spouse of the beneficiary who has a judgment or court
order for support or maintenance. 23 These creditors may compel distributions from trusts,
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regardless of whether the trust instruments include a spendthrift provision, if the trustee
has not complied with a standard of distribution or has abused a discretion.
This provision would make new law in Ohio in several respects. First, in
Matthews v. Matthews,24 the court held that a child support claimant could reach the
beneficiary‟s interest in a discretionary support trust. A key component of that decision
appears to be the court's finding that the trust did not specifically exclude the
beneficiary's child for whom support was being sought from benefiting from the trust.
We have not found an Ohio case addressing the ability of a child support claimant to
reach the beneficiary‟s interest in a discretionary trust that either did not provide for the
beneficiary/parent‟s support, or that explicitly excluded the beneficiary‟s children from
benefiting from the trust. Second, in Martin v. Martin,25 the Supreme Court rejected a
former spouse‟s attempt to reach a beneficiary‟s interest in a discretionary support trust to
enforce an alimony claim. Third, as discussed above, in Kreitzer the Supreme Court
allowed the state to compel distributions from a discretionary support trust to reimburse it
for the cost of institutionalized care it had provided the destitute beneficiary, and in
Martin, the Court in dictum suggested that Kreitzer might be applicable to other creditors
as well.
In order to make UTC §504 more closely track Ohio law, the ability to compel a
distribution has been limited in §5805.04 to children and current spouses, and this
remedy will not be applicable to (a) trusts in which the grantor has explicitly provided
that the child or spouse is to be excluded as a beneficiary,26 or (b) WDTs. The question of
whether, and if so to what extent, Kreitzer applies to creditors other than the state has not
been addressed in the OUTC, and thus will be decided, if and when raised, by the
courts.27

Spendthrift: Protection and Exceptions
The effect of a spendthrift provision under the OUTC is set forth in §5805.01(C):
“A beneficiary may not transfer an interest in a trust in violation of a valid spendthrift
provision, and, except as otherwise provided in this Chapter, a creditor or assignee of the
beneficiary may not reach the interest or a distribution by the trustee before its receipt by
the beneficiary.” While that part of §5805.01(C) is taken from the UTC, §5805.01(C)
also includes additional language that is not included in the UTC making it clear that real
property or tangible personal property owned by a trust, but properly made available for
use by the beneficiary under the terms of the trust, will not be treated as having been
distributed to the beneficiary for creditors‟ rights purposes.
UTC §503 provides that spendthrift provisions are unenforceable against three
types of creditors:
1) a beneficiary's child, spouse, or former spouse who has a judgment or court order
against the beneficiary for support or maintenance;
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2) a judgment creditor who has provided services for the protection of a beneficiary's
interest in the trust; and
3) a claim of this State or the United States to the extent a statute of this State or
federal law so provides.
OUTC 5805.02 has limited the scope of that section by recognizing only the first
and third type of exception creditors and by permitting only current spouses, not former
spouses, from being able to attach distributions. The first OUTC spendthrift exception,
for the support claims of a child or spouse of the beneficiary, is consistent with Ohio
law.28 Similarly, under Martin v. Martin,29 removing alimony claims of former spouses
from the list is also consistent with Ohio law.
UTC critics are concerned that permitting an exception for judgment creditors
who have provided services for the protection of a beneficiary's interest would result in
more litigation by disgruntled beneficiaries against trustees over the administration of
trusts, as this exception could be construed as permitting the beneficiary's legal counsel to
attach the beneficiary‟s interest, regardless of the outcome or the merit of the lawsuit. It
was for this reason as well as the lack of Ohio authority recognizing this class of
exception creditor that the Joint Committee did not include this type of judgment creditor
in OUTC §5805.02. 30
With respect to the spendthrift exception for certain governmental claims, if
federal law gives the United States access to a spendthrift trust beneficiary‟s interest (as it
does, for example, with respect to federal income tax liabilities), federal preemption
would require that the federal law prevail over any attempt by the state to stop such
claims. Similarly, inherent in the state's legislative power is the ability to enact legislation
enabling it, as a creditor, to overcome spendthrift provisions.
The UTC does not include an express statement that the only spendthrift
exceptions are those set forth in §503. UTC critics are concerned that silence on that
point might be answered by Restatement of Trusts (Third), in which comment a to §59
provides that “special circumstances or evolving policy may justify recognition of other
exceptions. . .” While such an argument presumably would be unsuccessful because
UTC §502(c) provides that creditors may not reach the beneficiary‟s interest in a
spendthrift trust “except as otherwise provided in this [article],” to avoid any question of
a judicial expansion of the list of spendthrift exception creditors on public policy
grounds, the OUTC includes a new division (D) to §5805.02, which provides that the
only exceptions to the effectiveness of a spendthrift provision are those listed in that
section.
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Mandatory Distributions
Generally, the effect of a spendthrift provision is to preclude a beneficiary‟s
creditor from reaching trust assets prior to their receipt by the beneficiary. To address the
possibility of a trustee not making mandatory distributions to a beneficiary that his or her
creditor could then reach, OUTC §5805.05(B), like UTC §506, allows a beneficiary‟s
creditor to reach a “mandatory distribution,” notwithstanding the existence of a
spendthrift provision, if the trustee has not made it “within a reasonable time after the
designated distribution date.”
While the UTC does not define “mandatory distribution,” the OUTC does. Under
§5801.03(12), “„mandatory distribution‟ means a distribution of income or principal,
including a distribution upon termination of the trust, that the trustee is required to make
to a beneficiary under the terms of the trust. Mandatory distributions do not include
distributions subject to the exercise of the trustee‟s discretion regardless of whether the
terms of the trust (i) include a support or other standard to guide the trustee in making
distribution decisions or (ii) provide that the trustee “may” or “shall” make discretionary
distributions, including distributions pursuant to a support or other standard.”
More generally, as discussed above, if spendthrift protection is not available,
under §5805.05(A) creditors of a beneficiary may “attach present or future mandatory
distributions to or for the benefit of the beneficiary, or…reach the beneficiary‟s interest
by other means.” However, also as discussed above, even if mandatory distributions are
due to the beneficiary and there is no spendthrift provision, or the creditor is an exception
creditor, §5805.05(A) authorizes the court to “limit an award under this section to such
relief as is appropriate under the circumstances, considering among other factors
determined appropriate by the court, if any, the support needs of the beneficiary, the
beneficiary‟s spouse, and the beneficiary‟s dependent children.”

Access of Decedent’s Creditors to Revocable Trust Assets
UTC §505(a)(3) allows a decedent‟s creditors to reach assets in the decedent‟s
revocable trust to the extent the probate estate is inadequate. In such a case,
administrative costs, funeral expenses, and statutory allowances also may be satisfied out
of the revocable trust. While this may be consistent with the law of most states, it would
represent a significant change in Ohio. Under Schofield v. Cleveland Trust Co.,31 a
creditor of a settlor of a revocable trust may not reach the trust‟s assets after the settlor‟s
death. While the first draft of the OUTC included a modified version of UTC §505(a)(3),
the Joint Committee, in furtherance of its mission of codifying, not modifying, Ohio law
in the area of creditor remedies, subsequently decided that the OUTC should not address
the Schofield issue one way or the other. Accordingly, UTC §505(a)(3) has been omitted
from the OUTC.
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Trusts Terminate if Against Public Policy
Under UTC §410(a), a trust terminates if its purposes become contrary to public
policy. This is a significant concern. In Young v. Ohio Department of Human Services,32
Justice Stratton, in dissent, wrote that special needs trusts violate public policy. The
inclusion of this provision in the OUTC is of particular concern to practitioners who draft
special needs trusts.
Perhaps part of the rationale for this provision in the UTC is that with the
elimination of the rule against perpetuities and the advent of perpetual dynasty trusts, it is
thought necessary for courts to have the ability to terminate trusts that are deemed to
offend then existing public policy. We are not aware of any Ohio cases, however, in
which the court has terminated a trust because its purposes were deemed to have become,
subsequent to the trust‟s creation, contrary to public policy.33 In another effort not to
change existing Ohio law, the Joint Committee decided to eliminate the statutory
authority for the judicial termination of trusts on the basis that a judge decides that the
purpose of the trust has become against public policy. While the statutory power has
been removed from the OUTC, no affirmative statement is made that courts lack this
power, thereby leaving Ohio law wherever it may currently be on this issue.

Rights of Holders of Presently Exercisable Powers of Appointment
OUTC §5805.06(B)(1), like UTC 505(b)(1), treats the holder of a power of
withdrawal (e.g., a Crummey power holder) as the settlor of a revocable trust, thus
making the property subject to the power subject to the claims of his or her creditors.34
That is the case, however, only during the period the power may be exercised. To
accommodate the use of Crummey trusts, division (B)(2) also provides that if the power
is not exercised, the holder continues to be treated as a settlor of a revocable trust only to
the extent the value of the property subject to the power exceeds the greater of the annual
exclusion or the 5 x 5 amount. Thus, if a beneficiary has a 30-day right to withdraw
$11,000 from a trust, the beneficiary will be treated as the settlor of the trust for creditors‟
rights purposes only to the extent of the $11,000 and only during the 30-day withdrawal
period. (As to the latter, the comment to UTC §505 provides that the creditor “would
have to take action prior to the expiration of the 30-day period.”)
The basis for the rules of the preceding paragraph apparently is the UTC‟s
assumption that in the enacting jurisdiction, property subject to an unexercised, but
presently exercisable, general power of appointment is subject to the claims of the power
holder‟s creditors. (The rationale for that rule, as set forth in the comment to UTC §505,
is that such a power is functionally equivalent to a power to revoke a revocable trust.)
While that is the law by statute in some states35 (and under federal bankruptcy law),36 at
common law it was not, because a “power” over property was not treated as an “interest”
in property.37 However, the common law rule in most states was that if a general power is
exercised, in favor of the power holder or a third party, the power holder‟s creditors could
reach the property subject to the exercise.38 In Ohio, however, two cases from the
1800s39 held that property subject to an exercised general power is not subject to the
10

claims of creditors of the power holder. Thus, if those cases remain good law, property
subject to a presently exercisable general power apparently may not be reached by the
power holder‟s creditors in Ohio whether the power is exercised or not. Because it
appears doubtful that an Ohio court would follow those old cases, however, the OUTC
follows the UTC‟s rules on treating the holder of a presently exercisable general power as
the settlor of a revocable trust (but only with respect to the property subject to the power)
for creditors‟ rights purposes during the period in which the power may be exercised.

Summary Table
The following table summarizes the types of creditor remedies that are available
under the OUTC against beneficial interests in basically three different types of trusts: (1)
the new statutory wholly discretionary trust, (2) trusts that have spendthrift provisions,
showing remedies for trusts that (a) provide for "mandatory" distributions as defined in
the OUTC, (b) are discretionary trusts that are not wholly discretionary trusts, that have a
distribution standard other than one that references the beneficiary's support, and (c) are
discretionary trusts that do have a support standard, and (3) trusts that do not have
spendthrift provisions, broken down into the three subcategories, (a) those that provide
for mandatory distributions, (b) discretionary trusts that have a distribution standard that
is not determined by reference to the beneficiary's support, and (c) discretionary trusts
that do have a support standard. The answers are often not as simple as "YES" or "NO."
In several cases a complete answer requires explanation, and in a small number of
instances the answer will be found in Ohio case law rather than in the OUTC.
Nevertheless, it is hoped that this table will offer a quick overview of creditor remedies
under the second draft of the OUTC.
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Proposed Revised Code Chapter 5805 is the OUTC counterpart of UTC Article 5.
The Joint Committee consists of members of the Ohio Bankers League Legal, Legislative and Regulatory
Committee and the Ohio State Bar Association's Estate Planning, Trust and Probate Law Section. The Ohio
Association of Probate Judges is also participating in preparation and review of the proposed OUTC.
3
The OUTC has previously been discussed in the Probate Law Journal of Ohio. See Newman, “The Ohio
Uniform Trust Code Takes Shape,” 14 PLJO 72 (March/April 2004); English, “The Uniform Trust Code
(2000) and Its Application to Ohio,” 12 PLJO 1 (Sept./Oct. 2001); and Locke, et. al., “Uniform Trust
Code,” 11 PLJO 49 (Mar./Apr. 2001).
4
Sections 154 and 155 of the Restatement (Second) distinguish between discretionary trusts, which provide
no standards for the exercise of the trustee‟s discretion, and support trusts, which require the trustee to use
the income and principal of the trust only for the beneficiary‟s support.
5
The classic definition of a trust includes the bifurcation of title of trust property between the trustee, who
holds legal title, and the beneficiary, who holds equitable title, to the trust assets. Further, trust beneficiaries
clearly have interests that they may protect from, for example, breach of duty by the trustee. Still, for
creditors‟ rights purposes, courts have held that beneficiaries of discretionary trusts have a “mere
expectancy” in undistributed trust assets until the trustee exercises its discretion to make a distribution. See,
e.g., United States v. O’Shaughnessy, 517 N.W.2d 574 (Minn. 1994).
6
See Comment to UTC §504, which states: "This section, similar to the Restatement [of Trusts (Third)],
eliminates the distinction between discretionary and support trusts, unifying the rules for all trusts fitting
2
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within either of the former categories." The UTC, including its Comments, can be found on the NCCUSL
web site at www.nccusl.org, under tabs “Trust Code” and then “Final Act.”
7
Under the OUTC, a “spendthrift provision” is simply one that “restrains both voluntary and involuntary
transfer of a beneficiary‟s interest.” OUTC §5801.03(19). Because spendthrift trusts were not valid in Ohio
until relatively recently (Scott v. Bank One Trust Co., N.A., 62 Ohio St.3d 39, 577 N.E.2d 1077, 1081 (Ohio
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